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Abstract: On one account, the moral point of view is impartial, hence in this sense objective. On a different
account, morality sometimes seems to recommend partiality, hence, in one sense of ‘partiality,’ bias. Still another
view says that in some cases morality is neutral between impartiality and partiality in choosing between alternative
actions. I will explore the topic of impartiality (objectivity) and partiality (bias) in first-order ethical argumentation
by reference to selected philosophers, including Derek Parfit and Peter Singer.
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1. Introduction
I begin with terms in the title of my paper. Following Alvin Goldman, I will take argumentation
to be “an act of presenting an argument to an audience or an interlocutor” (Goldman, 1995, p.
60). Ethical argumentation presents an ethical argument, practical or theoretical.
Objectivity, in one sense, is impartiality. The philosopher Shelly Kagan (1998) has this
sense of the word in mind when he speaks of “talking about goodness from what is sometimes
called an ‘objective’ point of view, [or] an ‘impartial’ point of view” (p. 42). In another sense,
for something to be objective is for it to be mind-independent. If values are in this sense
objective, then their being values is independent of our mental states, hence independent of our
attitudes.
Bias, in one sense of the word, is a pejorative term associated with prejudice and
unfairness. An online definition of “bias” lists synonyms of the word, one of which is
“partiality”1; a Wikipedia entry on bias says in part that “[b]ias is an inclination to present or
hold a partial perspective.”2 Hence the following question: in ethical argumentation, is partiality
(hence non-objectivity in the impartiality sense of objectivity) necessarily bias in the pejorative
sense? I will answer this question in due course.
My main concern will be with impartiality and partiality (hence with objectivity and bias
in corresponding senses of these words) in relation to arguments of the kind presented in firstorder ethical argumentation (hence in relation to first-order ethical arguments). Part of my
discussion will focus on one type of theory of practical reasons; theories of this type are
objective in as much as they hold that practical reasons are based on values that are objective in
the mind-independent sense.
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A further and final introductory point. There is a distinction to be drawn between
objectivity, in the sense of impartiality, as a possible feature of ethical argumentation, and
objectivity, in the sense of impartiality, as a topic of ethical argumentation in the domain of
moral philosophy. This domain is standardly divided into three areas: meta-ethics, normative
ethics, and applied or practical ethics. The question whether argumentation in applied or
practical ethics must be objective in the sense of impartial is a question in meta-ethics in as much
as it pertains to the meta-ethical topic of justification in ethics, but it is also a question in
normative ethics inasmuch as it pertains to normative-ethical theories—for example,
utilitarianism.
2. The moral point of view
First-order ethical argumentation (for example, argumentation in applied ethics) is argumentation
from the moral point of view. On one account, the moral point of view is impartial, hence in this
sense objective. I am thinking in particular of an account given by the philosopher Wayne
Sumner. According to Sumner (2011), the moral point of view appears to be distinguished from
other evaluative points of view “in two respects: its special concern for the interest, welfare, or
well-being of creatures and its requirement of impartiality. Adopting the moral point of view
requires in one way or another according equal consideration to the interests of all beings”
(Sumner, 2011, p. 408). This is how utilitarians see the moral point of view. Utilitarianism is
rigorously impartial. It holds that when utilities are calculated the utilities of all concerned are to
be counted and equal utilities are to be counted equally no matter whose they are. But for a
number of moral philosophers, the impartiality of utilitarianism is a defect of the theory. Russ
Shafer-Landau is a case in point. In an appraisal of utilitarianism, he says:
morality sometimes seems to recommend partiality. It seems right, for instance,
that I care about my children more than your children, that I care more for friends
than strangers…. And it also seems right to translate my care into action. If I have
saved a bit of money, and it could either pay for my son’s minor surgery or relieve
the greater suffering of famine victims, most of us will think it at least permissible
to pay the surgeon. But to do that is to be partial to the interests of my son.
(Shafer-Landau, 2012, pp. 141-42)
3. Parfit and practical reasons
The philosopher Derek Parfit, for his part, believes that morality can accommodate both partial
and impartial perspectives. This view of his is anchored in a meta-theory of practical reasons.
Some theories of practical reasons, Parfit (2011) holds, are objective, and others are
subjective. Objective theories claim that certain facts give us reasons to have certain desires and
aims, and to act on them. “These reasons are given by facts about the objects of these desires or
aims,” and so Parfit calls such reasons object-given (Parfit, 2011, p. 45). “If we believe that all
practical reasons are of this kind, we are Objectivists about Reasons” (Parfit, 2011, p. 45). Parfit
adds that “[o]bject-given reasons are provided by the facts that make certain outcomes worth
producing or preventing, or make certain things worth doing for their own sake” (Parfit, 2011, p.
45). Hence “we can call these objective reasons and theories value-based” (Parfit, 2011, p. 45).
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Subjective theories, in contrast, claim that our reasons for acting are given by facts about
us, and are therefore subject-given, rather than object-given. A theory of this sort might appeal to
our present desires or aims, or it might appeal to “desires or aims that we would now have … if
we had carefully considered all of the relevant facts…. If we believe that all practical reasons are
of this [subject-given] kind, we are Subjectivists about Reasons” (Parfit, 2011, p. 45).
Objectivists can admit that “many reasons for acting can be claimed to be given by the
fact that some act would achieve one of our aims,” but they would say that “these reasons derive
their force from the facts that give us reasons to have these aims. These are the facts that make
these aims relevantly good, or worth achieving” (Parfit, 2011, p. 45). For subjectivists, in
contrast, “we have no such reasons to have our aims” (Parfit, 2011, p. 46).
Parfit makes a detailed and scathing critique of desire-based subjective theories (Parfit,
2011, chs. 3, 4). He believes that “we ought to reject all subjective theories, and accept some
objective theory” (Parfit, 2011, p. 65). More specifically, he thinks we ought to accept what he
calls a wide value-based objective theory. Such theories are wide because they assign a place to
both impartiality and partiality. They hold that
[w]hen one of our two possible acts would make things go in some way that
would be impartially better, but the other act would make things go better either
for ourselves or for those to whom we have close ties, we often have sufficient
reasons to act in either of these ways. (Parfit, 2011, p. 137)
Parfit (2011) later says:
On such views, we are often rationally permitted but not rationally required to
give significantly greater weight, or strong priority, both to our own well-being
and to the well-being of those to whom we have close ties, such as our close
relatives and those we love. (p. 382)
In a similar vein, Parfit says that we can have strong reasons to care about the well-being of
certain people who are in certain ways related to us. He calls such reasons “person-relative or
partial” (Parfit, 2011, p. 40). But he also thinks that we can have reasons “to care about
everyone’s well-being” (Parfit, 2011, p. 40). Such reasons, he says, “are impartial in the sense
that… [they] are reasons to care about anyone’s well-being whatever that person’s relation to us”
may be (Parfit, 2011, p. 40). In addition to the possibility of our having impartial reasons, there
is the possibility of our having an impartial point of view. Our point of view is impartial “when
we are considering possible events that would affect or involve people who are all strangers to
us” (Parfit, 2011, p. 40). Moreover, even when “our actual point of view is not impartial, we can
think about possible events from an imagined impartial point of view”; we can do this “by
imagining possible events that are relevantly similar except that they involve people who are all
strangers to us” (Parfit, 2011, pp. 40-1).
Parfit doesn’t claim that we are rationally required to give equal weight to everyone’s
well-being; rather, he holds that we are rationally permitted “to give strong priority to the wellbeing of ourselves and certain other people, [and] that we are also rationally permitted to give
great weight to the well-being of strangers” (Parfit, 2011, p. 388).
He gives an example in which “I could save either some stranger’s life or the life of
someone to whom I have close ties,” such as my child (Parfit, 2011, p. 140). Parfit says: “I could
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not rationally choose to save this stranger. I ought morally to give priority to my child. I would
have other strong non-moral reasons to act in this way, such as the reasons … involved in my
love for my child” (Parfit, 2011, p. 141).
Here Parfit speaks of what I ought morally to do. He would say that I have sufficient
reason, indeed a decisive reason, to save my child. The reason is presumably given by what I
would aim to achieve, namely the saving of my child’s life. This reason is, in Parfit’s sense,
object-given; it’s also value-based because the saving of my child’s life would be good for my
child. Suppose that my saving my child’s life would fulfil a present desire of mine that is
stronger than any conflicting desire I may have. Then an adherent of a desire-based subjective
theory of reasons would agree that I have a decisive reason to save my child.
But there are moral cases in which, Parfit thinks, objectivists and subjectivists about
reasons would disagree. He gives an example in the course of discussing a moral principle he
calls the Consent Principle. This principle says: “It is wrong to treat people in any way to which
they could not rationally consent … if [they] knew the relevant facts, and we gave them the
power to choose how we shall treat them” (Parfit, 2011, p. 184). The example is this:
[T]wo people, White and Grey, are trapped in slowly collapsing wreckage. I am a
rescuer who could prevent this wreckage from either killing White or destroying
Grey’s leg. (Parfit, 2011, p. 185)
Parfit calls this example Earthquake. He says we should assume that “White, Grey, and I … are
all strangers to each other; nor do we differ in any other morally relevant way” (Parfit, 2011, p.
185).
Parfit asks what the Consent Principle implies for his Earthquake example: does it imply
that I ought to save Grey’s leg, or that I ought to save White’s life? What the principle implies
depends, Parfit says, “on our assumptions about which facts give us reasons” (Parfit, 2011, p.
185). Suppose that if I saved Grey’s leg, this would “much better fulfil Grey’s present fully
informed desires” than if I saved White’s life (Parfit, 2011, p. 185). According to a desire-based
subjective theory, the Consent Principle would then imply that it would be wrong for me to save
White’s life (Parfit, 2011, p. 185). But if we accept a wide value-based objective theory, the
Consent Principle would require me to save White’s life because, Parfit argues, Grey would have
sufficient reasons to choose either that I save her leg, “since this choice would be much better for
her,” or that I save White’s life, “for Grey could rationally regard White’s well-being as
mattering about as much as her own, and White’s loss in dying would be much greater than
Grey’s loss in losing her leg” (Parfit, 2011, p. 186). In contrast, “White would not have sufficient
reasons to give up her life so that I could save Grey’s leg” (Parfit, 2011, p. 186). Thus, the
Consent Principle “requires me to save White’s life, since this is the only act to which both Grey
and White could rationally consent” (Parfit, 2011, p. 186).
Suppose, however, that Grey is my best friend. Parfit would say that this assumption adds
a further morally relevant fact to the example—a fact directly relevant to the question whom I
should rescue.
Consider the following argument:
(a) Grey is my best friend and White is a stranger to me. Therefore, other things
being equal, I should rescue Grey rather than White. But White’s loss will be
greater than Grey’s loss. On balance, then, I should rescue White rather than Grey.
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According to this argument, the fact that Grey is my best friend and White is a stranger to
me presumptively favours my rescuing Grey rather than White, but this presumption is
outweighed by the fact that White’s loss will be greater than Grey’s loss.
Next, this argument:
(b) White’s loss will be greater than Grey’s loss. Therefore, other things being
equal, I should rescue White rather than Grey. But Grey is my best friend and
White is a stranger to me. On balance, then, I should rescue Grey rather than
White.
According to argument (b), the fact that White’s loss will be greater than Grey’s loss
presumptively favours my rescuing White rather than Grey, but this presumption is outweighed
by the fact that Grey is my best friend and White is a stranger to me.
Arguments (a) and (b) are balance-of-considerations partialist arguments. Argument (a) is
a weakly partialist argument in as much as it treats the fact that Grey is my best friend and White
is a stranger to me as an overridable presumption in favour of my rescuing Grey rather than
White. Argument (b), in contrast, is a strongly partialist argument in as much as for it the fact
that Grey is my best friend and White is a stranger to me outweighs the counterconsideration that
White’s loss will be greater than Grey’s loss.
A Parfit-type theory of practical reasons (that is, a wide value-based objective theory)
would permit weakly-partialist argument (a). But what about strongly-partialist argument (b)?
Does the fact that Grey is my best friend and White is a stranger to me outweigh the fact that
White’s loss will be greater than Grey’s loss, so that I have sufficient reason to rescue Grey
rather than White? This question, were Parfit to answer it, would require a value judgment on
his part. I make this obvious point in anticipation of a related point I will make in a moment.
A Parfit-type theory of practical reasons must hold that the values on which object-given
value-based reasons are based are objective in the sense of being mind-independent. For if these
values were mind-dependent in the sense that their being values depended on their being objects
of mental states such as desires, then reasons based on them would be subject-given, not objectgiven.
But suppose we wish to apply some Parfit-type theory with a view to deciding whether
we have a sufficient value-based reason to act on some aim of ours. This will require us to
evaluate the aim—is it good, or worth achieving? Our evaluation will express some mental state
of ours, such as an attitude of approval, and so it will be subject-given. Thus, even though a
Parfit-type theory of practical reasons is, for the reason Parfit gives, objective, its application is
inescapably subjective. In this connection, the following comment by Parfit about his
Earthquake example is noteworthy: “If Grey could choose how I would act, she would have
sufficient reasons, I believe, to make either choice” [my emphasis]—that is, to choose that I save
her leg or that I save White’s life (Parfit, 2011, p. 186).
4. Singer’s “basic argument” for donating to aid agencies
I turn now to an argument in practical ethics made by the philosopher Peter Singer (2011, p.
576). The argument is this:
1. Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical aid are bad.
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2. If it is in your power to prevent something bad from happening, without
sacrificing anything nearly as important, it is wrong not to do so.
3. By donating to aid agencies, you can prevent suffering and death from lack of
food, shelter, and medical care without sacrificing anything nearly as important.
Therefore,
4. If you do not donate to aid agencies, you are doing something wrong.
Singer acknowledges that the phrase “nearly as important” in premises 2 and 3 is vague, but says
that this is deliberate because he is “confident that [we] can do without plenty of things that are
clearly and inarguably not as valuable as saving a … life” (Singer, 2011, p. 577). As to what
these things are, Singer leaves it up to us, his readers, to decide.
He thinks that premise 2 is “very difficult to reject, because it leaves us some wiggle
room when it comes to situations in which, to prevent something bad, we would have to risk
something nearly as important as the bad thing we are preventing” (Singer, 2011, p. 576). For
example if “you can only prevent the deaths of other children by neglecting your own children,”
the principle stated in premise 2 “does not require you to prevent the deaths of the other
children” (Singer, 2011, p. 576). Rather, it permits you to give priority to your own children.
Thus, the principle permits partiality.
Singer considers a selection of what he calls “Common Objections to Giving,” and in
reply to one of them he says: “It is true that most of us care more about our family and friends
than we do about strangers. That’s natural and there is nothing wrong with it. But how far should
preference for family and friends go?” (Singer, 2011, p. 582). Suppose we are in a position to
donate money to aid the poor, but could instead use the money to help family or friends. Singer
admits that “[i]f family and friends really need the money, in anything remotely like the way
those living in extreme poverty need it, it would be going too much against the grain of human
nature to object to giving to them before giving to strangers” (Singer, 2011, p. 582). But later he
says this: “The fact that we tend to favor our families, communities, and countries may explain
our failure to save the lives of the poor beyond those boundaries, but it does not justify that
failure from an ethical perspective, no matter how many generations of our ancestors have seen
nothing wrong with it” (Singer, 2011, p. 583). This remark might be taken to imply that the
ethics of giving preclude partiality. But Singer’s premise-2 principle permits partiality in a case
in which contributing money to saving the lives of poor people in other countries would require
sacrificing the well-being of people in our own country whose need is at least nearly as great.
Such a case may be very unlikely to arise in a wealthy country, but it’s a conceivable case, and
Singer’s principle allows for it.
Suppose we decide in such a case that preventing the bad occurrences that (ex hypothesi)
we could prevent by donating money to assist needy people in our country would be at least
nearly as important as saving the lives of poor people in other countries. Then if we were to
apply a Parfit-type theory of practical reasons to the case, we would presumably decide that the
partiality we would show by giving priority to the needy people in our own country would be
permissible. At the same time, the theory would permit us to say that the well-being of poor
people in other countries matters as much as the well-being of poor people in our country.

6

DEREK ALLEN
5. Conclusion
Earlier I asked whether in ethical argumentation non-objectivity, meaning partiality, is
necessarily bias in the pejorative sense of the word. Shafer-Landau would say that it isn’t, and so
would Parfit and Singer. I think this view is correct.
Finally, a point about morality, partiality, and impartiality, and a related point about firstorder ethical argumentation. Even if there are cases in which morality permits partiality, there are
surely many cases in which morality requires impartiality—cases in which there is no good
reason not to give equal consideration to the interests of all those concerned. One way to
accommodate cases of these different kinds would be to say that the moral point of view is
defined partly by a defeasible presumption in favour of impartiality—a presumption that is
overridden just in cases in which there are sufficient reasons for partiality. On this interpretation
of the moral point of view, the same presumption applies to first-order ethical argumentation (for
example, argumentation in practical ethics), and this means that, absent sufficient reasons to the
contrary, ethical argumentation of this kind must be impartial, hence in this sense objective, and,
a fortiori, free of bias.
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